This is the single hardest question you can put to belief in God, and it has been for two thousand years. It is short enough to fit on a coin and heavy enough to break a faith. Below: the exact shape of the paradox, the strongest replies believers have built, and where each reply still strains. No thumb on the scale.
Michael Paycer
If God is good, why suffering?
Logical (answered), evidential (open)
Free will, soul-making, skeptical theism
The problem is not an insult to God; it is a logic puzzle. Hold up three things the tradition wants to say at once.
Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil?
The Epicurean paradox, as reported by Lactantius
Lay the three claims out plainly. God is all-powerful, so nothing stops him from acting. God is perfectly good, so he wants to prevent needless suffering. And suffering is real, vast, and often falls on those who did nothing to deserve it. Any two of these sit together comfortably. Getting all three to hold at once is the problem, and every serious response is an attempt to loosen one claim without letting go of it.
The strong version, pressed hard by J. L. Mackie, claims that God and evil are logically incompatible: if the two ideas contradict, then like a square circle, both cannot exist. Most philosophers now think this version fails, because the believer only needs to show a possible reason God might allow evil, not a likely one. That is the job the free-will defense does, and it does it well enough that the logical problem is widely considered answered.
The weaker-sounding version is the one that bites. It grants that God and evil could coexist, then argues from the sheer amount and apparent pointlessness of suffering that God is unlikely. William Rowe's example is a fawn burned in a forest fire, dying slowly and alone, its agony witnessed by no one and teaching no one anything. Multiply that by every hidden cruelty in history, and the claim is not that God is impossible but that a good God looks improbable.
The most rigorous reply, refined by Alvin Plantinga, argues that a world of free creatures is worth more than a world of puppets, and that real freedom makes real evil possible. God cannot force free beings to always choose the good without erasing the freedom that made them valuable. So moral evil, the cruelty people do to each other, is the price of a good worth paying. The strain: it says little about suffering no human chose, like disease, earthquakes, and animal pain.
John Hick, drawing on the early theologian Irenaeus, argued that the world is not meant to be a comfortable resort but a place that grows souls. Courage, compassion, and endurance can only exist in a world with real hardship to meet. Suffering is the friction that forms character. The strain: some suffering seems to crush people rather than grow them, and infants and animals gain no character from it.
A more modest reply concedes we cannot see a reason for much suffering, then denies that our not seeing one means there is none. A finite mind looking at an infinite plan is like a child watching a surgeon and seeing only cruelty. The strain: pushed too far, it can undercut all moral reasoning, since it invites us to doubt our judgment about what is good whenever it is convenient.
It is not God that I do not accept, only I most respectfully return him the ticket.
Ivan Karamazov, in Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karamazov
The logical version is mostly settled in the believer's favor. The evidential version is not settled at all. The debate has moved from "can these coexist" to "how much unexplained suffering can a good God's ledger carry."
The problem of evil is the analytic, courtroom version of a question every faith meets in its own way. For how the traditions actually live with suffering rather than argue about it, see how the world's religions explain suffering.
It is the argument that a God who is all-powerful, all-knowing, and perfectly good is hard to square with the amount of suffering in the world. A perfectly good being would want to prevent needless suffering, and an all-powerful being could, yet suffering is everywhere. Reconciling those claims is the problem.
The logical version claims God and any evil are strictly contradictory, so both cannot exist; most philosophers think the free-will defense answers it. The evidential version grants they could coexist but argues that the scale and apparent pointlessness of suffering make God improbable.
A theodicy is an attempt to justify God's goodness in the face of evil by giving a reason God might permit suffering. The best known are the free-will defense, soul-making, and skeptical theism.
Developed most rigorously by Alvin Plantinga, it argues that a world with free creatures is more valuable than a world of puppets, and that genuine freedom makes moral evil possible. God could not guarantee free beings always choose good without removing their freedom, so evil is compatible with an all-good God.
When I’m not weighing theodicies, I tune databases, design high-availability systems, and run cloud migrations.